conventional deterrence

Conventional deterrence will be a big part of calibrating the balance.

For all these reasons, conventional deterrence is moving up the list of jobs for America's military.

However, these letters refer to penalties in a conventional deterrence manner.

His pessimism lies in the contradictions between nuclear and conventional deterrence.

The Cold War proved this, and history provides not even one example of successful conventional deterrence.

Military forces for conventional deterrence range from missile-defense to airstrike options.

The last few years have brought forth a wider set of goals for conventional deterrence against rising powers and rogue states.

Holding mobile missile launchers at risk of attack will probably be the gold standard for conventional deterrence.

It remains just the type of flexible, proportionate tool essential to credible, conventional deterrence.

Conventional deterrence did not serve France well.

There's no reason to think the United States and its armed forces will depend less on airpower for conventional deterrence in the future.

To be credible, the nuclear deterrent must be underpinned by strong conventional deterrence.

After all, conventional deterrence still works.

However, tailored, proportional conventional airstrikes are a tool central to conventional deterrence.

It is therefore reasonable to ask: Is the United States keeping far enough ahead to make its conventional deterrence effective?

Elsewhere in his treatise he reflects on the possibility of combining nuclear deterrence with conventional deterrence.

Conventional deterrence is all about how to posture America's air and naval forces, in particular, to safeguard allies and national interests without resorting to war.

A fleet of no fewer than 250 F-22s would provide forces for conventional deterrence and allow more time to mature technologies before making a huge new investment.

The imbalance is nonetheless unsettling if the West is to rely less on nuclear and more on conventional deterrence.

For submarines that carry ballistic missiles, Admiral Trost saw a new role in conventional deterrence.

My immediate reaction was that the near-term objective has to have a response that reestablishes conventional deterrence on the peninsula.

He was not convinced by conventional deterrence: "The classical arms race creates instability, just as the nuclear race creates stability."

Research has predominantly focused on the theory of rational deterrence to analyze the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail.

What is emerging is how conventional deterrence may dominate the U.S. government's hard- and soft-power options in the years ahead.

That is the key point of conventional deterrence - to prevent bad things happening and getting worse so that escalation towards 'nuclear territory' does not occur.