Israeli planning was based on a 48-hour advance warning by intelligence services of an impending Egyptian attack.

There were two additional armored brigades, one to reinforce the forward brigade, and the other to counterattack the main Egyptian attack.

The simultaneous Egyptian attacks were poorly coordinated however, and the infantry and armor did not work well together.

The government described the small war which broke out a year later (2-14 July 1977) as an unprovoked Egyptian attack.

In July 1977 several battles occurred on the border, and Libyan aircraft were destroyed by an Egyptian attack.

The cable said that Israel had learned of an imminent Egyptian attack, which overshadowed the blockade.

Maimon also requested air support at the time of the Egyptian aerial attack.

Beyond the immediate danger of an Egyptian attack on its inadequate defences, however, Israel also faced two additional threats.

Egyptian attacks directed against the Israeli corridor, or the bridgehead, failed with heavy losses.

Once on the ground, they began preparing their planes for another Egyptian attack, which never materialized.