During this same period, the focus of military action has been on counterinsurgency warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The army in particular was skilled in both counterinsurgency warfare and conventional mechanised operations.

This is why the history of counterinsurgency warfare is a tale of failure.

Fortunately, there are leaders in the military who understand counterinsurgency warfare.

Yet it is true that the Marines are, historically, more experienced at counterinsurgency warfare than the Army.

Understanding and influencing the cognitive dimension of the local population is essential to winning counterinsurgency warfare.

This book describes the process by which the United States became a promoter of counterinsurgency warfare.

First, United States military aid was helping enhance the army's skills in counterinsurgency warfare.

True, the gulf wasn't Vietnam, where the Army was ill prepared for counterinsurgency warfare.

First, it is inherently difficult to measure progress in counterinsurgency warfare and nation-building efforts.