The US Army is responsible for military psychological warfare doctrine.

Gunfire support from cruisers and battleships had become an established part of United States amphibious warfare doctrine during World War II.

While Germany, and to some degree the Western Allies, adopted Blitzkrieg ideas, they were not much used by the Red Army which developed its armoured warfare doctrine based on deep operations.

In the interwar period, Patton remained a central figure in the development of armored warfare doctrine in the U.S. Army, serving on numerous staff positions throughout the country.

Brigade staff members were responsible for defining SADF amphibious warfare doctrine.

Their application of the warfare doctrine "shock and awe" was in contrast to special operations which revolved around clandestine and reconnaissance operation.

Both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese political warfare doctrine stem from the same historical antecedents at the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924 under Soviet tutelage.

These practices resulted in division of effort and an inability to profit from economies of scale, and inhibited the development of modern warfare doctrine.

Its firepower, ease of use, low production costs, and reliability was perfectly suited for the Red Army's new mobile warfare doctrines.

The purpose of these exercises was to formulate a workable amphibious warfare doctrine.